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Lavish Generosity 
The American Dimension of International Support for the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army 1968-1983 
by 
Michael McKinley 
It was due to the lavish generosity of American citizens 
that our country, so ravished by war, was able to sup-
port the derelicts of that war, the wives and children of 
prisoners, and those whose means of livelihood had 
been destroyed.1 
('AE') 
INTRODUCTION 
Irish-Americans have ever been sensitive to events and developments 
in the land of their ancestry. However, the travails of Ireland have not 
very often impinged upon the attention of the American people as a 
whole. Even less have they commanded the attention of the politicians of 
the United States or the American government. Nonetheless, since the re-
emergence of communal violence in Northern Ireland in 1968-69, the 
troubles have been accorded a special, if not always undivided and sus-
tained, attention, albeit from different perspectives and towards 
divergent and frequently conflicting ends, at all three levels. Thus, while 
it was not surprising that surnames such as Kennedy and O'Neill should 
recur in accounts of Irish-American activity, it was curious that they 
should do so in competition with say a Flannery or an O'Dwyer for the 
right to interpret the will of Catholic Ireland and to be heard as the Voice 
of Irish America. It was still more bizarre that they should have been in 
competition with those whose names suggested interests which were 
hardly Hibernian — Biaggi, Wolff, Won Pat and Zeferetti — to name 
but a few.2 
In other circumstances such situations might have qualified as em-
phemeral and, accordingly, not warranted a mention. However, in the 
context of this analysis, it is clear that at each level the particular external 
interests which gave rise to the situations instanced in the preceding 
paragraph not only became the concern of international politics, but also 
in some cases exerted considerable influence upon the course of the con-
flict in Northern Ireland. Basically these effects were in direct proportion 
to the support or commitment each interest group could marshal in sup-
port of four very general, and sometimes overlapping objectives which 
were, in descending order of influence: 
(1) a United Ireland predicated on an immediate and total British 
withdrawal from the Six Counties and brought about by 
violence if necessary; 
(2) a United Ireland brought about by what might be termed non-
violence due process; 
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(3) the acceptance of the situation in Northern Ireland as being en-
tirely an internal matter for the British Government either out 
of conviction, or the belief that to do otherwise would be to un-
duly disturb the trans-Atlantic (Anglo-American) relationship; 
and 
(4) the achievement of short-term specific objectives in Northern 
Ireland which may or may not have related to the future con-
stitutional status of Northern Ireland. 
This miscellany, quite obviously, is internally inconsistent, and for 
that reason, a useful guage by which to separate those that are the subject 
of this essay. For the most part the focus in the following pages is on 
those that advocate the first (and occasionally the fourth) objective. By 
espousing and supporting the recourse to violence by republican na-
tionalists in Ireland they set themselves apart and need to be analysed as 
a distinct and significant phenomenon of the American dimension to the 
Irish Question. 
Justified as this differentiation might seem in both intellectual and 
political terms, it must also be conceded that there are commentators, 
scholars and writers who would dismiss it as a form of excessive intellec-
tualisation or as a meaningless distinction. And foremost among such 
people would be the eminent Irish men of letters, Dr. Conor Cruise 
O'Brien, who maintains this position on the basis of a consequentialist 
argument. According to Cruise O'Brien, distinguishing between the in-
tentions, substance and style of the supporters of the Provisionals and 
for example, those such as Senators Edward Kennedy and Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, speaker of the House 'Tip' O'Neill, and former Governor of 
New York Hugh Carey, who have held for some fifteen years now a 
responsible position which eschews violence, is to engage in an ir-
relevance. His view is that the latter and all those that share their views, 
... suffer from one fatal idée fixe: that Ulster Pro-
testants are basically England's puppets and England (if 
rightly squeezed) can reverse their political allegiances.3 
Thus, he argues that it is of no matter that & prima facie case would 
appear to set them apart from the declared supporters of the Provi-
sionals: "their efforts are complementary in their effects and are so 
perceived by those who resist." They therefore stand accused, in Cruise 
O'Brien's judgement, "of unwittingly pushing Ireland — all of it — 
toward the abyss [of civil war]."4 
These views, it is emphasised, are not widely shared — for example, 
they have not been expressed by the British Government or the Irish 
Government, and both have records of candour in relation to any un-
wanted external involvement in the affairs of Northern Ireland. Never-
theless it was felt necessary to cite them here so as to acknowledge the 
essential difficulty that attends so many attempts to delineate the politics 
in, and of the province. At the heart of this difficulty is the ambiguity 
which results from disparate groups working towards somewhat similar 
objectives but advocating radically different means. If the unanimity of 
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the former sometimes dominates the mutual exclusivity of the latter the 
disposition to view all external interest as malignant is as understandable 
in subjective terms as it is difficult to accommodate intellectually. 
If any sense is to be made of the spectrum of support the Provisional 
Irish Republican Army derives from the United States, a selection must 
be made, consciously, reasonably and in good faith. In the perhaps un-
Irish hope that this will find wide, if not unanimous acceptance, the 
following analysis excludes those parties which neither directly nor inten-
tionally give succour to the IRA; it includes, on the other hand, those 
organisations which openly espouse the IRA's cause in the United States 
and provide it, from a trans-Atlantic remove, with what the strategists 
refer to as 'the sinews of war.' To facilitate this analysis a further selec-
tion is made in relation to time frames, for reasons which can only be 
alluded to in the proceeding pages. 
1968 - MARCH 1976 
The selection of these dates is forced on any account of the 
American dimension for the reason that, within them, the activities of 
Irish Americans and others who supported the IRA were in ascendance 
over all other Northern Ireland-related activities in the United States. It 
is to be noted, however, that the general interest evinced by Irish 
Americans in events in Northern Ireland throughout 1968-69 was hardly 
a new development. Neither was it unusual that it should be expressed by 
some in cash and kind. In times of strife in Ireland since the last century 
such an expression has virtually defined the relationship between the 
Irish at home and those in the United States to the point where, in the 
Declaration of Independence of 1916, the support of Ireland's 'exiled 
children in America' was especially recognised. In December 1969 the 
breakaway Provisional Army Council, in the face of overwhelming 
evidence that the Irish Republican Army (IRA) which had existed prior 
to that time was unable to provide the maximum defence for the 
Republican population of Belfast, made a plea which, although less 
specific, was clearly directed at the USA: 
We call on the Irish at home and in exile for increased 
support towards defending our people in the North and 
the eventual achievement of the full political, social, 
economic and cultural freedom of Ireland.5 
The message was clear; it was a call to provide aid for military ac-
tion. However, the likelihood that it would produce an effective and im-
mediate response in military terms was not overwhelming. This was a 
consequence of a number of factors, perhaps the most important being 
the attrition due to Américanisation of the ethnic Irish. It also reflected 
the overall inability of the Northern Ireland conflict itself to inspire and 
mobilise, in any sustained fashion, groups (journalists, civil libertarians, 
American radicals, the Democratic Party, etc), which by their traditions 
and/or their principal interests, might have been expected to have pro-
vided sympathy and assistance. This meant that no more than an 
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'emaciated framework' was available upon which to build an aid net-
work in 1968-69.' 
The organisational malaise was exacerbated by the fact that, despite 
the claimed predominance of those with North of Ireland ties within it, it 
also included what Dennis Clark observed as an "... estrangement, con-
fusion of viewpoints, and a general perplexity about what could be done 
in any practical way."7 In turn, this determined the essentially negative 
character of the support network which resulted, and its aversion to any 
cognitive effort with regard to the future of Ireland — as instanced by its 
recourse to slogans — 'England Get Out of Ireland' or its equivalent. 
It was probably no surprise, then, that James Bowyer Bell's 1971 
edition of his standard history of the IRA should have contained the 
following passage: 
Any kind of armament acquired in Ireland is very dear 
indeed (a revolver may cost eighty pounds), and outside 
Ireland there are few sympathetic sources or sponsors. 
American money flowing into Dublin in response to the 
troubles in the North was far less than the English Sun-
day papers liked to believe...[emphasis added].8 
The amount which Bell thought fit to dismiss thereby was of the order of 
"hundreds of thousands of pounds.'" 
It was a surprise, therefore, to find that the English papers were in 
fact closer to the mark in their estimate of a general American willingness 
to contribute funds to relief programmes in Northern Ireland, and, more 
particularly to the IRA. In late August 1969, Bernadette Devlin, visiting 
the United States on behalf of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Associa-
tion (NICRA), claimed to have received 'pledges' totalling $US650,000 
for the 'homeless' of the Six Counties.10 In October of the same year the 
actual amount estimated to have been raised was a considerably less, but 
still substantial, $US92,000." The following year, total American funds 
for a multiplicity of uses was estimated at $US450,000,12 an amount 
which was consistent with Mick Flannery's claim that, for the three years 
to October 1972, the organisation which he represented (the Irish Nor-
thern Aid Committee) had been responsible for forwarding some 
$US500,000 to the North." 
Evidently, the IRA did not miss out on the bonanza. In Bell's 1974 
edition of The Secret Army his 1971 opinion was noticeably changed in 
respect of the US financial response to the Provisional's appeals of 1970: 
Already some money had begun to flow through a varie-
ty of pipelines, in some cases to independent defense 
groups in the North but increasingly through overt or 
covert conduits to Dublin G.H.Q. or various 
Republican aid committees. The response from America 
was like nothing since the Troubles....1' 
Exactly how much the Provisional IRA received Bell did not divulge. In-
deed, apart from the inference that the financial aid it received was 
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substantial, the only conclusion which can be drawn with any certainty, 
even at this time, is that stated by Clark — that "the full record of 
assistance to the Catholic minority and to the IRA will ever remain ob-
fuscated."15 
Nevertheless, there were patterns and influences clear in those early 
years which were to govern American influence upon the Northern 
Ireland conflict until the mid-1970s. First, despite Bernadette Devlin's 
fund-raising success of August 1969, the socialist views she professed 
were anathema to the essentially conservative Irish-Americans who 
formed the large majority of contributors.16 Indeed, in view of subse-
quent events, the latter's generosity at that time must be seen as an in-
discriminate outpouring of sympathy for the plight of the Northern 
Catholic community. The measure of American opposition for Devlin's 
goals may be gauged from a report that a visit by her in 1971, during 
which she met Black Panthers and hippies, and after she had given birth 
to a child out of wedlock, yielded only some 150 pounds after expenses. " 
Second, it followed that the Official IRA, with its openly socialist 
orientation, was unlikely to be popular with the Irish-American com-
munity, and indeed, this was the case. By the same logic the Provisionals 
should also have been excluded from the financial benevolence of that 
community. The fact that they were not resulted from their not entirely 
deserved appearance as a more 'traditional' Republican organisation. 
While the Provisionals were certainly closer to the mainstream of 
Republic tradition than their Official counterparts, their philosophy and 
policies, such as they were, admitted some of the same left-radical 
elements which the Irish-American community found so unacceptable." 
The Provisionals, however, were possessed of more forethought, 
guile and dishonesty. They contrived, and quite cynically at that, to 
enhance their appeal to those who lived in the past while muting their 
adherence to socialist principles — both being undertaken in the belief 
that the end, however ill-defined, justified the means, however 
disagreeable. It worked, as Maria McGuire testified: 
There should be copious references to the martyrs of 
1919 and 1920-22 — the period most of the audience 
would be living in. Anti-British sentiment, recalling 
Cromwell, the potato famine, and the Black and Tans, 
could be profitably exploited. By no means should 
anything be said against the Catholic Church. And all 
references to socialism should be strictly avoided — tell 
them by all means that the Ireland we were fighting for 
would be free and united, but say nothing about just 
what form the new free and united Ireland would take. 
The formula was in general, very successful...." 
Indeed, it was so successful that the Official's network of support in 
the United States could not be described as other than modest. 
Therefore, unless specifically excepted, all references to the IRA in the 
following pages are to its Provisional wing. 
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The financial broker for the Provisionals' trans-Atlantic fund-
raising is the Irish Aid Committee — NORAID, also known as INAC. 
According to its statement of registration with the U.S. authorities under 
the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 1938, (FARA), it was founded in 
New York City in April 1970 by three IRA veterans of the civil war 
period, Mick Flannery, Jack McCarthy and John McGowan,20 'in 
response to an urgent call from its foreign principal, the Northern Aid 
Committee, Belfast.'21 Accordingly, since its foundation, NORAID's 
record has been consistent in four aspects. It has: 
(1) boasted of the large amounts it was remitting to persons such as 
Joe Cahill22 in Northern Ireland; 
(2) insisted that while these funds were intended for "relief," it was 
up to "the people on the other side" to decide how to spend 
them; 
(3) agreed that part of the money was used for the purchase of 
arms; and 
(4) repeatedly, and without reservation, supported the Provi-
sionals' campaigns. 
The organizational structure upon which NORAID's efforts are 
based has been variously estimated at 100 chapters (in 1972, by Flannery) 
and 80 chapters (in 1975, also by the NORAID source).23 The latter is 
generally regarded as the more reliable figure. Similarly, the NORAID 
claim of 80,000 members throughout the US has been discounted by of-
ficial sources as an absurd exaggeration which was probably based on a 
paper estimate of members attending social functions over a particular 
period. The estimate which is favoured is "several thousand...possibly 
upwards of 2,000," who are sufficiently numerous and active to have a 
considerable effect on most Irish-American organisations in the United 
States.24 Of this number the largest concentration is in New York and the 
National headquarters is in the Bronx. Otherwise the most important 
centres are Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Los Angeles, 
Baltimore, and various towns in New Jersey and Connecticut.25 Among 
those who have spent some time observing its activities, NORAID has ac-
quired a reputation, based on an apparently high level of visible co-
ordination, as a close-knit and disciplined group.26 
In support of its activities NORAID appears to command the full-
time attention of its President and Vice-Presidents.27 It also runs a week-
ly newspaper, the Irish People, with a full-time editor. In addition, in 
1975 Flannery (then President) was known to have a telex machine in his 
home in the Bronx and, according to journalists who visited him there, 
received continuous reports on it from Provisional sources in Ireland.28 
Unfortunately the use of modern technology has frequently failed to ad-
vance NORAID's understanding of the issues in Northern Ireland; for 
example, one report carried in the Irish People claimed that the Irish 
Special Branch had attempted to break an IRA ceasefire by organising 
sectarian murders in collusion with the Northern Ireland Social 
Democratic and Labour Party.29 
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To further sustain the fund-raising and lobbying operations, 
NORAID has played host to a number of prominent Provisionals such as 
Billy Kelly30 and Ruairi O Bradaigh,31 but they and others were 
hampered by the US Immigration and Nationality Acts which exclude 
aliens "connected with organisations which advocate the killing of 
government agents or the unlawful destruction of property." While this 
provision undoubtedly had an effect on the guest-of-honour lists for 
money-spinners such as dances and dinners, it probably had little impact 
on the other main source of finance, direct subscriptions. 
To judge by reports and the schedule attached to NORAID's more 
recent six-monthly returns under the FARA, most contributors are 
working-class Irish Americans. In some cases the arrangements are in-
stitutionalised; a number of Locals of the Transport Union and the 
Longshoremen's Union in New York are said to contribute fixed weekly 
amounts to the organisation (NORAID has close links with the national 
presidents of both unions). In addition, a small number of wealthy Irish 
Americans such as hotelier Billy Fuller are known to be contributors, as 
are some Irish-born owners of chains of bars in New York who both con-
tribute funds themselves and allow their establishments to be used as col-
lection centres. However, it is understood that the larger contributors in 
America, like those in Ireland, try to maintain anonymity by insisting 
that their contributions be 'laundered.' 
The results of these combined efforts have summarised in the 
following table: 
TABLE 1 
Irish Northern Aid Committee 
Reported Details of Financial Undertakings32 
(All amounts in US Dollars) 
Six Month 
period ended 
29 July 
29 January 
29 July 
29 January 
29 July 
29 January 
29 July 
29 January 
29 July 
29 January 
Minimum Tc 
1: 
1971* 
1972 
1972" 
1973 
1973 
1974 
1974 
1975 
1975 
1976 
>tal 
Income 
no information 
no information 
no information 
172,000 
159,617 
129,968 
121,822 
115,522 
130,852 
no information 
$829,781 
Expenditure 
4,575 
12,738 
25,440 
41,388 
19,581 
10,826 
8,193 
11,620 
44,472 
24,955 
$203,788 
Disbursements 
to N.I. 
11,500 
128,099 
312,700 
150,438 
121,723 
99,966 
110,833 
102,648 
70,977 
64,205 
$1,173,089 
Surplus 
not known 
not known 
not known 
-19,826 
18,313 
19,176 
2,796 
1,254 
15,403 
not known 
$56,942 
* Information taken from document entitled 'Supplement Statement'. 
"Information taken from hand-written draft 
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As may be seen, Flannery's October 1972 claim (cited earlier) that 
NORAID had sent close to $US500,000 to Northern Ireland in the three 
previous years was probably not excessive; in just the eighteen month 
period ended 29 July 1972 the total remitted was $US452,299. But there 
were, and remain reservations about accepting many of NORAID's 
claims. The above, for instance, mentions a three year period — 
presumably from October 1969 — yet NORAID's statement of registra-
tion also claims that it was founded some seven months later in April 
1970." Furthermore it is obvious from the table that, in default of in-
come figures for the first three reporting periods, and of a complete 
absence of reliable information before that time, even the most informed 
estimates of NORAID's financial dealings could be hopelessly wrong. 
In this regard it is useful to refer to the return for 29 January 1973, 
in which it will be found that nearly $US20,000 in excess of reported 
receipts was remitted. This suggests that latter figures detailed under 
'Surplus' appear to confirm — that part of each six months takings are 
retained, to bolster poor performances, aid special projects in the future, 
or establish a capital fund. 
For undefined reasons this latter question of a steadily accumulating 
NORAID fund has received no attention from commentators, yet it is, 
potentially, of some significance. At the very least it could, if NORAID 
chose to falsify its returns, be used for a period of one-two years to 
disguise the falling away of financial assistance from the average level 
since 1976. On the other hand, there is a widely held belief that 'blood on 
the streets' of Northern Ireland, or what are euphemistically termed 
'spectaculars,' particularly daring IRA operations, induce the sym-
pathetic Irish-American community to renew or increase its contribu-
tions. The suggestion that some of the surplus has been used in sustaining 
or enhancing this cannot be discounted.34 If it should be thought that 
such suggestions unwarrantedly impugn the honesty of NORAID's of-
ficials, there is always the caveat provided by the attorney responsible 
over some years for the monitoring of the organisation's compliance 
with the FARA, that they were of a type who "just can't treat straight 
with any government."35 
Thus it is only prudent to conclude that the figures produced in the 
foregoing represent less than accurate accounts of NORAID's transac-
tions. Indeed NORAID personnel were reported, in 1975, to have 
boasted in private of much greater sums than those found in the table — 
up to $US4 million per year — being remitted to Northern Ireland.36 As 
these claims were generally held to be more in the nature of romantic 
speculation, the conservative 'official' figures remain as the best 
available, albeit probably understated, indication of the intensity and 
fluctuations of popular Irish-American support for the Provisionals. 
By way of comparison, it is interesting to note the extent to which 
the potential of Irish-America was not realised, as illustrated by the 
following examples. Throughout the entire period 1968-83 the best 
NORAID appeared capable of, in so far as attracting public figures in 
support of its fund-raising, was to interest actor Richard Harris, 
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thriller-writer Len Deighton and President of the Longshoremen Teddy 
Gleason, in attending a dinner for which the Provisional Republicans 
faithfully paid $US18 per head. Yet an Ireland Fund Dinner, organised 
by Tony O'Reilly, probably the most prominent and successful Irishman 
living in the United States," could count on the presence of leading 
members of the Irish-American establishment — such as Speaker 'Tip' 
O'Neill — and would command $US175 per plate.3' 
The distinctions, needless to say, were only superficially of a 
culinary nature. What they attested to was the failure, foreshadowed at 
the outbreak of the troubles, of the aid network to expand its following 
beyond the narrow confines of the sectional 'Old Irish' (Republican) in-
terests. In general, not the politicians, not the wealthy Irish-Americans, 
nor the Catholic Church found the prospect of associating with 
NO RAID worth the opprobrium it would have earned them." It was to 
be expected, therefore, that the isolation of the activists should have ex-
tended to non-Irish-American organisations and the higher reaches of 
the US Federal Government, although the former was the more difficult 
to account for. After a promising beginning in which specialised groups 
of humanitarians concerned themselves with Northern Ireland, their in-
terest withered; groups working in the fields of foreign policy, inter-
religious understanding, and anti-colonial concerns generally avoided the 
issues of Northern Ireland with a consistency quite inconsistent with their 
stated objectives. 
If there was any one reason for this behaviour it was to be found in 
Northern Ireland and in the terror bombing campaigns of the IRA. As 
Clark wrote of these other, influential and many 'friends of Ireland' and 
their view of the network: 
...they saw it as tied to more of the same murderous 
violence without solution that they recoiled from in 
Vietnam.41 
In this they were perceptive. While NORAID spokesmen were in-
clined to pretend that its funds were used purely for relief, there were far 
too many instances in which the lie was given to this claim. As one 
anonymous representative explained in 1971: 
Our job is to get up the money and send it to the people 
over there. What they use it for is up to them. We attach 
no strings. Everything we do in this country is aimed at 
assisting the final phase of the struggle for freedom in 
Ireland.41 
Moreover, there is irrefutable evidence that several of NORAID's 
officers were implicated in numerous arms offences which led to trials in 
Canada and the United States. The following year the same manifesta-
tion of support without responsibility was clear in Mathew Higgins' 
(Vice President of NORAID) statement that: 
We're involved in supporting the activities of the Provi-
sional IRA and that Branch of Sinn Fein which supports 
the Provisional IRA. We provide what funds we can 
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and the people on the other side have to decide what has 
to be used for what purpose.43 
In 1975 he was even more frank: 
We have no objections to it [the purchase of guns] if 
they have no money to spare. They've got to get them 
from somewhere. If the overall kitty is big enough to 
buy weapons that's their business. We were formed for 
the purpose of supporting the Irish Freedom movement. 
We still support the Provisional IRA — no ifs and buts 
about that ....44 
For some time, however, there was no irrefutable evidence that 
NORAID, perse, engaged in activities other than fund-raising and supp-
ly. On the other hand, there appeared to be little refuge for the organisa-
tion in Mick Flannery's protestations that allegations of gun-running 
were 'terrible' and 'vicious' lies, and in his appeal to the Scottish 
juridical prerogative that 'no one has ever proved a thing.'45 By the end 
of 1982 Flannery's cover was particularly transparent with his admitted 
involvement as a conspirator in an unsuccessful venture to smuggle arms 
to IRA from the United States.46 
According to a report of testimony given in the trial of Frank 
Grady, convicted in New York in March 1976 for illegally exporting arms 
and falsifying documents, the organisation's intentions were clear from 
the earliest days of its existence: 
Shortly after the formation of the [Yonkers] branch, 
they [Grady and others] were approached by Martin 
Lyons, then a senior official at Northern Aid head-
quarters and one of the founders of the organisation 
and asked to assist in the purchase and export of guns 
for use by the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland.47 
Thereafter, the most notorious case involved the 'Fort Worth Five' 
in 1972. This became a cause célèbre in both Irish-American and US civil 
rights circles because, from the viewpoint of the former, of the issue of 
the supply of arms and ammunition to the IRA and, from the latter 
perspective, of constitutional and civil rights questions. Among other 
cases which came to light were those of Charles Malone, a NORAID 
member living in San Francisco, and James O'Gara, a New York 
NORAID official, both of whom were convicted on arms charges in 
1973. Within a year, four people — two Irish and two Irish-Americans — 
were convicted in Baltimore, Maryland, of conspiring to smuggle 158 
semi-automatic rifles (worth about $US30,000), plus armour-piercing 
shells and other explosives from New York to Ireland. According to 
reports this was the biggest case of gun-running to take place in the 
United States, and although there was no indication in the course of the 
trial as to who or what provided its financial backing, the Baltimore 
District Attorney, Jeff White, left little doubt as to what inference 
should have been taken: 
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The Statements [at the trial] didn't actually mention the 
Irish Northern Aid Committee, but it was clear who was 
meant. ...We didn't make radical distinctions between 
the two groups [NORAID and the IRA]. Statements 
made at the trial in reference to the group which came 
up with the money were to 'Irish' and 'IRA,' but we 
considered them to mean the Irish Northern Aid Com-
mittee.48 
Further grounds supporting this conclusion were provided by three 
instances in the two succeeding years. The first concerned the 1975 con-
viction of Joseph Myles, described by the police as "an executive officer 
of a US organisation, Northern Irish Aid [sic]," on a charge of con-
spiracy to export arms to Ireland. The second was the Grady case, 
already mentioned, while the third related to two Philadelphians — Neil 
Bryne and Daniel Cahalane4' (head of NORAID's Delaware County 
Chapter) — who were found guilty of illegally exporting arms to the 
IRA.50 
Such examples not only highlighted the value of the United States as 
an armoury to the IRA, but also pointed to the potential which existed 
for a widening of the conflict by involving American citizens in ancillary, 
or actual, fighting roles — or at least the fear of this development. Early 
on, there were reports that a group calling itself the United Ireland Com-
mittee of New York had enlisted volunteers to fight in aid of the Catholic 
population in the North but these seem now to be either overstated or 
simply patriotic fiction. Scepticism, also, was attached to reports that the 
IRA had obtained the services of former American servicemen and that 
some of them were under investigation by the Army Council for spying 
and treachery. These reports relied heavily on the judicious use of 
statements by unidentified British military and IRA personnel which did 
not necessarily confirm the claim of the articles, and they appear to have 
been carried only in the papers of the Berry group.51 
The same dismissive attitude was not appropriate to, nor was it 
adopted by, any of the governments concerned, in respect of the trans-
Atlantic traffic in arms for the IRA. According to Stanley Orme, a 
Minister of State at the Northern Ireland Office, the evidence from 
recovery operations conducted by the security forces in the Province in-
dicated that 85 per cent of the Provisional's weapons originated in the 
United States,52 thus establishing that country as its most important 
single source of supply.53 
The American government, notwithstanding the seriousness with 
which it viewed this matter, disputed the British estimates. One agent of 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Dom Zimmerman, 
countered that a claim of even 75 per cent was "a ridiculous exaggera-
tion."54 Moreover, the available data appeared to support his position, 
although certain juxtapositions of time were required in order to achieve 
such support. In the same June 1975 article which carried Zimmerman's 
statement, it was reported that 1,581 "guns of American manufacture" 
had been found in Northern Ireland connected with the IRA. This figure, 
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when compared with the overall (Ulster-wide) total of 4,974 for the 
period 1971-75,55 represented a proportion of approximately 30 per cent. 
This appeared to be a steadily decreasing ratio over time; when figures to 
1979 were taken, it fell as low as 23 per cent, for weapons which were 
"said to be of US manufacture."56 
If allowance is made for the fact that the 1971-75 percentage was ar-
tificially high because of the figure of 1,581 included recoveries of US 
arms for 1969 and 1970 as well, but omitted total (Ulster-wide) recoveries 
for the same period which must have increased the figure of 4,974, then it 
would seem that there was a wild divergence between the competing 
British and American estimates. Irrespective of the interpretation given 
to the statistics of arms recoveries, they confirmed in a rather obvious 
way the relative ease with which the IRA was able to replenish and main-
tain its fighting requirements in Ulster, a point made by Bell and Jones.57 
Indeed, some arms were reported to have travelled the greater part of 
their journey in style — aboard the Cunard liner, Queen Elizabeth II." 
It is possible, however, to effect a reconciliation between the 
American and British claims by reference to the impressive record of the 
actual weapons which the IRA came to use. In 1969 it was poorly armed, 
where it was armed at all. By 1971 it had introduced the Armalite AR 130 
(the civilian, semi-automatic version of the selective fire AR IS) and the 
Ml Garand into its arsenal. From 1972 on these were supplemented by 
military surplus and commercial variants of the Ml carbine, the AR IS, 
and the M3 SMG ('Grease Gun').5 ' As from 1974, recoveries in Northern 
Ireland included the above weapons plus small quantities or single ex-
amples of the following: 
(1) AG 42b semi-automatic rifle (Swedish Army surplus); 
(2) NATO MIA semi-automatic rifles (commercial name for M 14 
U.S. Army rifles); 
(3) GA1/42 semi-automatic rifles (Wehrmacht surplus); 
(4) SAFN semi-automatic rifles (Venezuelan Army surplus); 
(5) M 62 semi-automatic rifles (current Finnish Army rifle); and 
(6) NATO Beretta 59/69 semi-automatic rifle (current Italian Army 
rifle).60 
According to R.D. Jones of the British Intelligence Corps, the above 
list was "very significant." Apart from the M3 SMG, all the weapons 
listed were available over the counter in the United States — with the last 
two having the names of firearms dealers engraved upon the receiver.61 If 
one added to this the knowledge that until 1973, the AR 180 was made 
under licence in Japan, and thereafter by the Stirling Armament Co. Ltd. 
of Great Britain, for sale and distribution by the Armalite company at 
Costa Mesa, California, and hence forwarded to the IRA from the US, 
the grounds for a considerable divergence of views became well establish-
ed. They became even more so in the light of the claim made by (US) 
Assistant Attorney-General, William Olsen, that some Americans were 
involved on behalf of the IRA in attempts in Mexico to illegally pur-
chase, inter alia, this same weapon. Whether or not such factors fully 
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accounted for the conflicting views is not clear, but it may be inferred 
that they were substantially a consequence of the British government's 
position that the term 'American arms' should be interpreted so as to en-
compass those which were modern and to include weapons which were 
not only of US manufacture, but also of a loosely defined US origin. 
This despite the fact that the AR 180 (according to Bell the 'IRA's 
favourite weapon'), by virtue of being made by Stirling, was in effect 
also a British weapon." 
But the list also indicated that the IRA possessed a multiplicity of 
types and calibres among both their longarm and pistol weaponry. In 
Jones's opinion this reflected the success of the security forces in 
repeatedly depriving the IRA of its weapons, and its subsequent recourse 
to piecemeal procurement. The further consequence was that insoluble 
problems of maintenance were created, which in turn exacerbated the 
supply situation by rendering useless weapons with relatively simple 
faults.63 Thus despite its success in obtaining arms and ammunition in 
quantity, it was evident by 1978 (the year of Jones's article) that, in the 
period 1968-1976, the IRA had probably failed in its objective of obtain-
ing them according to its criterion of "identical...and recent manufac-
ture."64 
From the vantage point of 1987 this conclusion is further confirmed. 
The record of US financial and material assistance in the early and 
mid-1970s now appears as a guttering of a candle rather than the advent 
of a truly transnational movement. Although the figures do not show it, 
it is Clark's contention that "apathy reconquered the spirits of many" in 
the Irish-American support network after the Ulster Workers' Council 
Strike in mid-1974.65 Certainly NORAID's reported disbursements to 
Northern Ireland show a dramatic tumble in 1975, and by that time, too, 
there was an apparent hiatus in gun-running sufficient to suggest that 
major attempts were a matter of history. American interests in Ireland 
were to be revived, but as a result of initiatives which are beyond the 
scope of this essay. For the most part, these were undertaken by those 
whose motivations might be classified as other and better than the 
motivations which coloured this early period. 
MARCH 1976 • 1983 
If this paper was to address the American dimension in its fullest 
sense, it would concentrate on the significance of political developments 
which eclipsed that of the support network in the period 1976-1980. It 
would feature the role of certain prominent Irish-American politicians — 
Hugh Carey, Edward Kennedy, Daniel Patrick Moynihan and 'Tip' 
O'Neill — and their efforts to move a President in what culminated, in 
1977, as the "Carter Initiative." Thus it would consider the emergence, 
at the highest political levels in the United States, of a more pragmatic, 
and ultimately, a more responsible approach to the Irish Question than 
had been in evidence before. This is, however, outside the present terms 
of reference but, nonetheless, the period between March 1976 and 1983 
needs to be understood within that context. 
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In order to understand the decline in support it is necessary to con-
sider, first, the standing and effectiveness of the Northern Ireland sup-
port network in the US after 1976. In so far as the supply of arms was 
concerned, the record provides a qualified confirmation of the optimistic 
assessment given in 1977 by the US Ambassador to the Court of St. 
James, Kingman Brewster, that it was on the wane. The reason for this 
caution is that there were a number of claims which, when set against the 
available evidence, appear exaggerated, if not contradictory. 
On one hand there is the IRA claim, inspired it seems by low-grade 
science fiction, that it had shot down a British Army Air Corps Gazelle 
helicopter using a US-made M-60 machine gun firing 'specially 
developed magnetic bullets.' This was almost certainly a fabrication. In-
deed, reports of the Army inquiry into the loss of this aircraft pointed to 
a structural or dynamic failure after a "beyond-limits manoeuvre."66 
Nevertheless, it was true that the IRA was in possession of a small 
number of belt-fed M-60s, which it is now generally believed were stolen 
from a National Guard armoury in Danvers, Massachusetts. Exactly 
who stole them and how they were obtained is not clear. In any case, the 
possession of this weapon, a somewhat cumbersome one for the urban 
operations which are the mainstay of IRA actions, was more important 
for the psychological boost it gave its owners than for its military value. 
On the other hand, US explosives were in good supply: according to Bell 
and Coogan, IRA sympathisers working on the construction of the New 
York City water tunnel diverted sizeable quantities of this material to 
Ireland in the course of the project.67 Also acquired from the US were 
useful field aids such as stolen US Army electronic binoculars which 
made worthless the infra-red torch surveillance of the Northern Ireland 
security forces.68 
None of these indications, however, provided a clear image of the ex-
tent of supply of arms and associated equipment from the US to the IRA. 
Nevertheless, there were facts and figures which suggested that the arms 
traffic was being reduced in this period. By September 1979, American-
made arms comprised only 23 per cent of arms recovered by the security 
forces in Northern Ireland — down from approximately 30 per cent in 
1975 (based on the analysis undertaken previously).69 Even allowing for 
the basis upon which it computed its estimates of the national origin of 
recovered arms, the British government, in 1981, reduced its estimate of 
American arms to 47 per cent, down from 85 per cent in 1976.,0 Finally, in 
late 1981, NORAID was placed on the defensive with the arrest in New 
York of four Irish-Americans including founder Mick Flannery and a 
branch treasurer on arms-smuggling charges. In the same period NORAID 
itself was required to amend its registration under the Foreign Agents 
Registration Act of 1938 to show the Irish Republican Army as its foreign 
principal, rather than the 'Northern Aid Committee, Belfast, Ireland.' 
Legal action with a similar objective was also taken by US federal 
authorities against the organisation's newspaper, the Irish People. 
Though these developments pointed to a contradiction of the 
American dimension in respect of weapons, there were two further 
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developments which suggested the contrary. First, reports of the use of 
'US arms' by the IRA continued throughout the period under review, 
despite the recovery of such arms in search operations by the security 
forces. Second, certain contradictory information became available after 
the successful interdiction of an IRA arms supply route in February 
1982. According to Federal immigration officials, a conduit from the US 
to Dublin and Belfast had been in operation from as far back as 1974. 
Furthermore, in the eighteen months prior to the interdiction, at least 
twelve smuggling operations had been allowed to pass unhindered in 
order to piece together precise details of the IRA's network which ex-
tended from Dublin through Amsterdam and Toronto to Buffalo. 
TABLE 2 
Irish Northern Aid Committee 
Reported Details of Financial Undertakings" 
(All amounts in US Dollars) 
Six Month 
period ended: 
29 July 
29 January 
29 July 
29 January 
29 July 
29 January 
29 July 
29 January 
29 July 
29 January 
1971 
1972 
1972 
1973 
1973 
1974 
1974 
1975 
1975 
1976 
Minimum Six Year 
29 July 
31 January 
29 July 
29 January 
29 July 
29 January 
31 July 
31 January 
Four Year 
Total: 
1976 
1977 
1977 
1978 
1978 
1979 
1979 
1980 
Total: 
Minimum Ten Year 
31 July 
31 January 
31 July 
Total: 
1980 
1981 
1981 
Minimum Eleven Year 
Total: 
Income 
no information 
no information 
no information 
172,000 
159,617 
129,968 
121,822 
115,522 
130,852 
no information 
$ 829,781 
80,201 
81,262 
84,017 
68,713 
84,091 
83,417 
74,550 
140,074 
$696,325 
$1,526,106 
90,056 
105,124 
250,511 
$1,971,796 
Expenditure 
4,575 
12,738 
25,440 
41,388 
19,581 
10,826 
8,193 
11,620 
44,472 
24,955 
$203,788 
20,278 
12,342 
12,914 
11,985 
19,179 
17,672 
21,653 
15,625 
$131,648 
$335,436 
Disbursements 
to N.I. 
11,500 
128,099 
312,700 
150,438 
121,723 
99,966 
110,833 
102,648 
70,977 
64,205 
$1,173,089 
55,500 
48,000 
60,115 
39,000 
73,857 
59,200 
61,616 
105,230 
$502,518 
$1,675,607 
52,000 
69,200 
92,800 
$1,889,607 
Surplus 
not known 
not known 
not known 
-19,826 
18,313 
19,176 
2,796 
1,254 
15,403 
not known 
$ 56,942 
4,423 
20,920 
10,988 
17,728 
8,945 
6,545 
-8,719 
19,219 
$80,049 
$136,991 
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By these accounts, the IRA was operating a regular and relatively 
sophisticated system of weapons procurement out of North America. In 
the absence of any reference to the quantities involved it is not possible at 
this stage to assess the full significance of this system, nor is it possible to 
extrapolate merely from its existence and international extent to the 
alleged operation of a French Connection through Brittany. Never-
theless, on balance this would appear to be a system which was not only 
operating under pressure, but at a reduced scale compared to its earlier 
performance. 
Financial support, as reflected in the bi-annual returns of the Irish 
Northern Aid Committee (NORAID), and set out in Table 2, is also dif-
ficult to guage. These figures are subject to the same qualifications and 
reservations which were made in respect of NORAID's returns earlier. 
According to information provided by IRA defector Peter McMullen, 
the discrepancy between reported and actual income of NORAID could 
have been staggering. Whereas the organisation claimed to have raised 
some SUSI.5 million between 1971 and 1980, McMullen claimed that, 
between 1969 and early 1981, nearly $US5 million had been received by 
NORAID." 
However, if official figures are the criterion, a different, seemingly 
confused, picture is painted. For the most part (eight out of eleven), the 
level of NORAID's six-monthly receipts post-1975 is down in com-
parison with that of the earlier period. The confusion stems from the 
three exceptions to this pattern, though it is instructive to approach them 
with a knowledge of events within each return period. Thus,*in the return 
for 31 January 1980, the increase coincides with a period that included 
the murder of Lord Mountbatten and the killing of eighteen British 
Soldiers at Warrenpoint, County Down (August 1979). The second un-
characteristic return is that filed for the period ended 31 January 1981 — 
a period which also brackets the IRA bombings in Britain of December 
1980." The third, and by far the largest amount of income reported by 
NORAID, was for the period ended 31 July 1981, during which time the 
H-Block hunger strike campaign by Republican prisoners in the Maze 
Prison outside Belfast reached its peak.74 What emerges, then, is a rein-
forced belief in the criminally perverse power of 'blood-in-the streets' 
("spectaculars") to loosen the purse strings of Irish-Americans sym-
pathetic to the Provisional cause. In the absence of such stimuli, 
however, the financial reports of NORAID suggest that Northern 
Ireland gradually slipped as a priority from 1976 onwards. Regrettably, 
for both the relevant US Government agencies and students of the Irish 
question, NORAID in the early 1980's refused to file details of its finan-
cial undertakings. 
In other respects, too, it was apparent that the support network was 
faced with reduced interest. In September 1978, Teddy Gleason, a Vice-
President of the Irish National Caucus, a pro-Provisional lobby group, 
and President of the International Longshoremen's Association, called 
for a world-wide boycott of British goods in support of demands being 
made by four relatives of Irish prisoners in Long Kesh (the name by 
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which the Maze Prison was formally known). Despite the fact that 
Gleason expected full support for the measure from the Executive of the 
American Federation of Labor — Congress of Industrial Organisations, 
seven of whom were first generation Irish-Americans, British commerce 
was not endangered. This should not have been a surprise to anyone, 
least of all to Gleason; he had, in 1975, disavowed boycotts as being 
unlikely to either save lives in Ulster or bring the sides to the bargaining 
table. 
Furthermore, when American intervention by those associated with 
the network became more direct, lack of interest at home was replaced by 
hostility in Northern Ireland. Thus in 1978, the Deputy Leader of the 
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), John Hume, denounced 
the American Ancient Order of Hibernians for their crude attempts to 
sabotage US investment initiatives. According to him, there was evidence 
that the latter, under the sway of some of its leadership who sympathised 
with the IRA, had resorted to suggesting that, in general, there should be 
no American investment in the North. They argued that such investment 
would result mainly in Protestant employment and warned that one US 
company in particular should be "concerned about the possible safety of 
its plant." As Hume was quick to observe, the notion that a lack of in-
vestment would somehow contribute to political change was not only 
'misguided,' but difficult to reconcile with the (American) Hibernians' 
recent resolution at a conference in Killarney which purported to offer 
friendship to Protestants. 
Overall, the situation in the US could be attributed to five factors 
although their relative weight may be difficult to ascertain. Political 
developments, or the lack thereof, in Northern Ireland formed the most 
obvious factor influencing the situation. The Ulster Workers Council 
Strike in 1974 gave birth to a political stalement which effectively re-
mains to this day. Furthermore that stalemate was followed by a decrease 
in the level of violence (as compared with the early 1970s). When com-
bined they deprived the support network of what Clark termed "the 
energizing effect [of] constant headlines."75 
Secondly, there was an erosion of support by conservative Irish-
Americans as a consequence of their increasing awareness of the IRA's 
socialist orientation — evidenced by its assassination campaign against 
Northern businessmen. Thirdly, within the United States weariness from 
years of activity had so sapped the movement that much of it, even 
before 1976, was pervaded by apathy.76 Fourthly, it appears that, by 
1979, at the latest, a breach had developed between NORAID and the 
Irish National Caucus as a result of personality clashes and a conflict 
over which group was to provide the leadership for Irish-American sup-
porters of the Provisionals. 
Finally, the network and those associated with it were out of touch 
with the prevailing mood which, from March 1976 in both Northern 
Ireland and the US, embodied a firm rejection of violence, and hence of 
the Provisionals. In the former it rose from the courageous stand taken 
by the Peace People and the promise and inspiration they provided 
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across the sectarian divide.77 To many around the world, accustomed to 
being informed only of the carnage which was sweeping Northern Ireland, 
the peace group seemed the best hope for a solution that had emerged in 
eight years of conflict. Even when the promise which the Peace People 
represented proved illusory and the Provisional movement subsequently 
grew in popularity, the above impediments were sufficient to militate 
against any notable rejuvenation or re-energising of the support structure. 
At this point it is appropriate to return to the perspective under 
discussion in this essay, principally concerning the supply of American 
arms and finance to a relatively localised conflict which, between 1968 and 
1983, claimed the lives of 2,200 people. Sadly, in terms of the natural and 
man-made hazards to which the world is accustomed, it is frequently 
regarded as a small toll of a small war in the north-eastern confines of a 
small country. Other indices confirm this: according to a Foreign Aid 
Commonwealth Office authority on the situation in Northern Ireland, 
ballistic signatures indicated that, in 1978, only about 1,000 weapons were 
in active use in the Province.78 This, and the relatively small quantity 
described in virtually all of the IRA's attempts to acquire arms from the 
US and other sources, both frustrated and successful, is a caution against 
taking too expansive a view of the American dimension. 
If it is accepted, as a precautionary measure, that NORAID's returns 
are understated by fifty per cent, the amounts in question are still relatively 
small in terms of external support for on-going nationalist irredentist 
struggles in the 1980s. They are also less than lavish (to use 'AE's descrip-
tion) when one has considered the amounts that could have been for-
thcoming. Had the entire Irish-American community truly been seized by 
the Irish question as, for example, the American Jewish community had 
internalised the Zionist cause over the last three decades, contributions 
might have been much greater. The significance of the American dimen-
sion of support for the IRA, however, lies in the fact that Northern Ireland 
is a small place and that NORAID's contibutions can provide a significant, 
if not essential, component of its operating capability. 
It is important, therefore, to appreciate the strength and vitality of the 
IRA in its campaign of attrition against Britain. To this end, the record of 
casualties is revealing. The conflict in Northern Ireland has claimed, on 
average, one hundred and fifty lives per year since the 'troubles' broke out 
in 1968. Outside the Six Counties, the comparable figure is around ten. It 
is a persistent and serious conflict. Since the IRA has been responsible for 
the majority of those deaths, it follows that that enduring organisation 
must be taken seriously. Just how seriously was illustrated by a 1978 
British military intelligence report, which concluded: 
[The IRA] has the dedication and the sinews of war to 
raise violence intermittently to at least the level of early 
1978, certainly for the foreseeable future ....79 
As a reminder, in just the first nine months of 1978 (the quietest year 
since 1970 in security terms), the official toll of violence in Northern 
Ireland was: 
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Killed — 14 soldiers, 
18 policemen, 
42 civilians; 
Shooting incidents — 591 
Bomb Explosions — 260 
Firearms Recovered — 305 
Explosives Recovered — 882 pounds. 
In addition 664 people were charged with security-type offences. In this 
same period, the Provisionals' profile was also quite high in Britain and 
Western Europe. 
Accepting that, for the most part, the thrust of security force opera-
tions is against the IRA, then figures such as those for the first nine 
months of 1978 are especially significant. At the supply level alone, such 
figures suggest that the Provisionals were acquiring arms at a rate faster 
than they could be intercepted or recovered. This was also stated in 
Document 37. ,0 No matter that the IRA's support and arms supply net-
work was, apparently, under pressure at this time, and no matter that 
1978 was a 'quiet' year: between January and September, 66 people were 
killed in Northern Ireland. Sufficient to recall Peter Janke's admonition 
that, in relation to arms, "very, very few suffice."" 
It is this reverse economy of scale that lends perspective to the work-
ings of the IRA. On the one hand the IRA is capable, as it was on the 
night of 6-7 March 1979, of detonating 49 bombs in 22 towns throughout 
Northern Ireland, or of breaching the security of Britain's royal family, 
as Lord Mountbatten's murder proved. On the other, it operates at this 
level so infrequently as to suggest the existence of powerful constraints 
against doing so on a sustained basis. It is as though the world in which 
the IRA operates is treated periodically to the potential rather than the 
immediately realisable force of the Provisional movement. 
Notwithstanding this disjunction between the IRA's capability and 
performance, any international influence contributing to the death and 
destruction that did result can only be described as malign. This is par-
ticularly so of the support network in the United States, whether or not 
contemporary generosity is as deserving of the description of lavish, as it 
was in the 1920s. The fact remains that, even in the leaner years which 
followed 1976, the importance of this component remained, still pro-
viding the IRA with the "sinews of war." 
It was of no matter that the IRA was by then self-sufficient in terms 
of generating financial resources, and that, in any case, only a minority 
of Irish-Americans were lending their support to the Provisional cause. 
A substantial, if undetermined, portion of the violence, suffering and 
death in Northern Ireland must be attributed to US support down 
through the years. 
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